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I. Introduction
While most states impose taxes on the personal income of their
residents as a means of generating revenue,' individuals residing in
Florida enjoy a life without the burdens of state income taxation.
However, the Florida Constitution and legislature do provide the state,
county and local governments with useful revenue generating devices in
the form of such taxes as ad valorem taxes,3 convention development
taxes,4 and sales taxes.5 The Supreme Court of Florida must often de-
termine whether or not the taxes authorized by the Florida legislature
are valid both facially6 and as applied to a given taxpayer.7
* Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University, LL.M. in Taxation, University
of Florida; J.D., University of Tennessee.
1. E.g., ALA. CODE § 40-18-21 (1975).
2. The Constitution of the State of Florida prohibits the state from levying a tax
upon the income of natural persons. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(b).
3. FLA. STAT. § 200.01 (1985).
4. FLA. STAT. § 212.057 (1985).
5. FLA. STAT. § 212.05 (1983). The sales tax is a tax on the exercise of the
privilege of engaging in the business of selling tangible property at retail in Florida.
6. E.g., DeLand v. Florida Pub. Service Co., 119 Fla. 804, 161 So. 735 (1935),
in which a tax of ten cents for every sale of electricity in a city, which could not be
passed on to the consumer, was declared to be an unconstitutional confiscation of
property.
7. E.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 311 (Fla.
1984), in which the court upheld a tax imposed on aviation fuel but not on fuel used by
railroads. Eastern claimed that such a tax was discriminatory, and was therefore inva-
lid. The court disagreed stating that "a statute that discriminates in favor of a certain
class is not arbitrary if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction or
difference in state policy." Id. at 315. See also, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 455 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1984) citing the principle that no state may impose a
tax which discriminates against interstate commerce by providing a direct commercial
advantage to local business. In that case, Delta challenged Florida Statute § 220.189
(1983), which granted a corporate tax credit against the Florida fuel tax; the credit
was only available to Florida-based carriers, which gave such carriers a direct commer-
cial advantage.
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In 1985, the Supreme Court of Florida heard five key cases deal-
ing with taxation. This article will discuss those cases and their impact
on Florida taxpayers.
Sales Tax: Campus Communications, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue8
While the University of Florida's football program languished
under the watchful eye of the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion,9 the Florida Department of Revenue (D.O.R.) subjected the Uni-
versity's student run newspaper, known as The Alligator,0 to equally
painful scrutiny.
In general, the Florida statutes provide that newspapers are ex-
empt from sale taxes." However, the D.O.R. is delegated the authority
to make, prescribe and publish reasonable rules and regulations con-
cerning what types of publications qualify as newspapers for the pur-
poses of the sales tax exemption.' 2 Pursuant to that delegated author-
ity, the D.O.R. adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.08,
the relevant portions of which are:
12-A-1.08 Newspapers, Magazines and Periodicals.
(I) Receipts from the sale of newspapers are exempt...
(3) In order to constitute a newspaper, the publication must
contain at least the following elements:
(a) It must be published at stated short intervals (usually
daily or weekly).
(b) It must not, when successive issues are published, consti-
tute a book.
(c) It must be intended for circulation among the general
public.
(d) It must have entered or qualified to be admitted and en-
tered as second class mail matter at a post office in the county
where published.
8. 473 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 1985).
9. In 1985, the Florida Gators were placed on probation, which precluded them
from participating in post-season bowl games, and denied them a share of the South-
eastern Conference championship.
10. The paper's official name is The Independent Florida Alligator. The Alliga-
tor is not under the control of the University of Florida; instead, it has been indepen-
dently operated since the 1970's.
11. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(6) (Supp. 1986).
12. FLA. STAT. § 212.17(6) (1971).
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(e) It must contain matters of general interest and reports of
current events.
(4) To qualify for exemption as a newspaper, a publication
must be sold and not given to the reader free of charge. So-called
newspapers which are given away for advertising and public rela-
tions purposes are taxable.
Because The Alligator has no second class mailing permit, and is
given to readers free of charge, it fails to meet the definition of a
"newspaper" as set forth in Rule 12A-1.08 3(d) & (4)."S Thus, the
D.O.R. assessed sales taxes against the publisher of The Alligator,
Campus Communications, Inc. The D.O.R. reasoned that a taxable
sale occurred when Campus Communications purchased the newspaper
with the intent to give the paper away rather than sell it. Campus
Communications sought review of the D.O.R.'s decision within the
D.O.R. itself, but to no avail. However, the trial judge in the Circuit
Court granted Campus Communications' motion for summary judg-
ment. The D.O.R. in turn appealed the trial court's decision to the
First District Court of Appeal.
The district court had previously held Rule 12A-1.08 to be valid,14
and thus rejected The Alligator's argument that the rule was an inva-
lid exercise of delegated legislative authority.' 5 However, the court was
not certain that the Rule could be validly applied to tax a school news-
paper like The Alligator, especially if such a publication was clearly a
newspaper despite its failure to meet the criteria of the rule. Because of
the district court's uncertainty on this issue, it certified the following
question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
Is Rule 12A-1.08, Fla. Admin. Code, which requires taxation of all
publications which are not sold but are given away, unconstitu-
13. Because a second-class mailing permit is available only to newspapers with a
paid circulation, the primary "flaw" with The Alligator was the fact that it was a
publication with free circulation. The postal regulations concerning second-class mail-
ing were invalidated by a federal district in The Enterprise, Inc. v. Bolger, 582 F.
Supp. 228 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). In that case, the court held that discrimination between
paid and free-distribution newspapers was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the
first amendment protection of free speech and the fifth amendment equal protection
clause.
14. North Am. Publications, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 434 So. 2d 954
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 449 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1984).
15. Department of Revenue v. Campus Communications, Inc., 454 So. 2d 30
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
Tax 1155
3
Gershon: Of Alligators and Hotel Beds: A Review of Florida Supreme Court D
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
tional as applied to The Alligator and similarly situated school
publications?"'
The supreme court's answer to the question was yes."7 It held that
The Alligator was indeed a newspaper within the meaning of the stat-
ute, 8 and should, thus, be exempt from sales tax. The court's decision
discussed the need to differentiate between shoppers and newspapers, in
that the main purpose of a shopper is the widespread distribution of
advertising and not news.' The court stated that Rule 12A-1.08 could
be a valid tool in distinguishing between shoppers and newspapers but,
that as it is now written, the rule creates an irrebuttable presumption
that a free publication cannot be a newspaper, as a matter of law, even
if such publication is factually a newspaper within the plain meaning of
the Florida statutes.2 0 It is this irrebuttable presumption which renders
the rule void as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority."1
Therefore, the sales tax imposed upon The Alligator was im-
proper, as the publication factually qualified as a newspaper for the
purpose of the tax exemption. The supreme court's ruling forced the
D.O.R. to amend 12A-1.08 to include some way for publications dis-
tributed free-of-charge to rebut the presumption that they are advertis-
ing circulars rather than newspapers. The court's decision is perfectly
16. 454 So. 2d at 31.
17. 473 So. 2d at 1295.
18. The court relied on the common sense of definition of newspaper, stating that
the statutes "had reference to the natural, plain and ordinary significance of the word
newspaper - the understanding of the word newspaper in general and common us-
age." Gasson v. Gay, 49 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. 1950). The court also looked to other
jurisdictions for support in its finding. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
decision of Greenfield Town Crier, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 385 Mass. 692,
433 N.E.2d 898 (1982). The Massachusetts court -in Town Crier held that "[Tihe fact
that a newspaper is not a 'publication' until it is published does not support the conclu-
sion that a paper, which is a 'newspaper' upon publication is anything less than a
'newspaper' before publication." 385 Mass. at 695-696, 433 N.E.2d at 900.
19. Green v. Home News Publishing Co., 90 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1956). The Alliga-
tor was a student run publication, used to train student journalists. It had a wide range
of news stories and a relatively low percentage devoted to advertisements (under 55%
during the period for which tax was assessed, well below the national average of 63%).
20. See supra note 18.
21. A rule which enlarges, modifies or contravenes statutory provisions consti-
tutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. State Dep't of Business Reg-
ulation v. Salvation Limited, Inc., 452 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Thus,
when the administrative body, the D.O.R., created a rule which taxed a newspaper,
The Alligator, it unconstitutionally used its delegated rule-making authority.
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reasonable. It would defy logic to hold that a publication sold for a
penny could be a newspaper, while one given away free could not, as a
matter of law. The question of whether a publication is indeed a news-
paper is essentially a question of fact, not of law.
Hotel Bed Tax: Golden Nugget Group v. Metropolitan Dade
County.2
Section 212.057 of the Florida Statutes (1983), known as the
"Convention Development Tax" Act authorizes certain counties to levy
a three percent (3%) bed tax on payments made to rent, lease or use
any living quarters or accomodations for a period of thirty (30) days or
less. The Act only applies to counties which have adopted home rule
under the Florida Constitution of 1885,23 as preserved by the Constitu-
tion of 1968.24 While Dade, Hillsborough and Monroe Counties qualify
for home rule, only Dade county has adopted a home-rule charter.
Thus, only Dade County could utilize the "Convention Development
Tax".
The purpose of the Act is to provide counties with funds to im-
prove the largest existing publicly owned convention center in the
county's most populous municipality. Dade County, eagerly seeking to
take advantage of a revenue making opportunity, enacted ordinance 83-
91, which "implemented the tax and provided for the collection, distri-
bution and application of the revenues. '"25
Naturally, hotel and motel operators in Dade County were not
pleased with the prospects of an additional tax on their customers.
Therefore, they filed suit seeking a determination that the Act, and the
Dade County Ordinance enacted pursuant to the Act, were invalid and
unconstitutional. The trial court agreed that the Act was invalid, be-
cause it included no mechanism for tax collection and by implication
provided that the revenues would be segregated and paid to municipali-
ties in contravention of Florida Statutes.2 The court also held that the
ordinance was invalid because it authorized the collection of tax by the
Dade County Tax Collector which caused a conflict with section
22. 464 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1985).
23. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 10, 11 and 24 (1885).
24. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) (1968); see FLA. STAT. § 125.011(1) (1985).
25. FLA. STAT. § 212.057 (1983).
26. FLA. STAT. § 212.230 (1983).
Tax 1157
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212.18, Florida Statutes (1983).27
Dade County appealed the trial court's decision to the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal. 8 The district court did not agree with the trial
court's conclusion concerning the validity of the Act "because the stat-
ute was expressly made a part of chapter 212, which includes a com-
prehensive scheme for the collection, administration, and enforcement
of all taxes imposed by the chapter. ' 29 However, the district court re-
fused to allow Dade County to assess the "bed tax" stating that the tax
must, instead, be collected by the State Department of Revenue, and
paid to the state treasurer.30 The state treasurer would then return the
revenues to Dade County when the county was ready to make appropri-
ations for improvements on the largest publicly owned convention
center in Miami."1
While the district court held Dade County's ordinance to be inva-
lid, its decision was, in effect, a victory for the county over the hotel
owners. The district court held that the Act itself was constitutional
and was an appropriate means to enhance the tourist trade 2 in three
tourist oriented counties. The defect found by the court of appeal con-
cerned only the technical means for collecting the tax. Thus, the hotel
and motel owners sought review by the Florida Supreme Court, in the
hope that the supreme court might find the bed tax itself to be
unconstitutional.
Unfortunately (?) for the hotel owners, the supreme court was in
total agreement with the Third District Court of Appeal."3 Further-
more, in the interim, the legislature had amended section 212.057 to
27. Section 212.18 of the Florida Statutes (1983) requires that the state be the
collector of the convention development tax. More specifically, § 212.18(2) states that
"the department shall administer and enforce the assessment and collection of the
taxes, interest and penalties imposed by this chapter." The convention development tax,
which falls under § 212.057, is clearly within chapter 213 of the Florida Statutes.
There is, therefore, no authority which provides for collection of the tax by the Dade
County Appraiser.
28. Metropolitan Dade County v. Golden Nugget Group, 448 So. 2d 515 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
29. Id. at 518.
30. Id. at 519.
31. Miami is the largest city in Dade County. The Act requires that the funds be
used to develop the convention center in the largest city of the home-rule county in
question. FLA. STAT. § 213.057 (1985).
32. 448 So. 2d at 520.
33. 464 So. 2d at 535, 537.
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require the D.O.R. to collect the bed tax.34 Thus, anyone renting, leas-
ing or using accomodations for less than thirty days in Dade County
can expect to pay a three percent bed tax. Interestingly enough, if the
revenues generated by the bed tax are used properly, Dade County's
attraction as a convention center will be enhanced, which will in turn
enhance the business of the hotel owners in Dade County. It is possible
that, at least in terms of long-range potential, the best thing that could
have happened to Dade County hotel operators was that they lost this
case.
Ad Valorem Tax on Household Goods of Nonresidents:
Golding v. Herzog.35
Tangible personal property36 is subject to an ad valorem tax in
Florida. However, this ad valorem tax is not applied to personal effects
used for the creature comforts of the owner, rather than for commer-
cial purposes.37 Thus, personal clothing and household furnishings are
all exempt from ad valorem taxation.,3  The Department of Revenue
has not actually contested that exemption as applied to Florida
residents.39
On the other hand, the D.O.R. has promulgated an administrative
rule' 0 which states in part that household goods and personal effects
which belong to nonresidents are subject to ad valorem taxation.4 1 The
D.O.R., an ever vigilant watchdog of constitutional rights, reasoned
that the legislature could not constitutionally exempt household goods
34. See 1984 FLA. LAWS 84-67; FLA. STAT. § 212.057 (1985).
35. 467 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1985).
36. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(11) (1985) establishes the definition of "personal prop-
erty." The statute distinguishes between household goods and tangible personal prop-
erty. Household goods are defined as "wearing apparel, furniture, appliances, and other
items ordinarily found in the home and used for the comfort of the owner and his
family." The statute provides further that household goods are not held for commercial
use or resale. § 192.001(11)(a).
Tangible personal property means "all goods, and chattels, and other articles of
value capable of manual possession and whose chief value is intrinsic to the article
itself." Household goods are expressly excluded from this definition. § 192.001(1 1)(d).
37. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(11)(a), (d) (1985).
38. Department of Revenue v. Markham, 381 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
39. 467 So. 2d at 981.
40. FLA. ADMIN. CODE rule 12D-7.02.
41. Id.
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and personal property from ad valorem taxation, since the Florida Con-
stitution provides for a means of taxing "all property. '42 Such enlight-
ened thinking gave rise to an administrative rule which provides that
household goods and personal effects belonging to persons not making
their permanent home in Florida are not exempt from ad valorem taxa-
tion, even though no such tax is imposed upon Florida residents.43 Pre-
sumably, Florida residents were allowed the exemption, not because of
any constitutional provision, but because the D.O.R. decided that the
administration of an ad valorem tax on household goods of Florida resi-
dents would be a revenue loser due to the excessive administrative costs
from such an effort.4
Interestingly enough, the First District Court of Appeal in the case
of Department of Revenue v. Markham,45 had already determined that
household goods should be exempt from ad valorem taxation irrespec-
tive of the nonresident status of their owner. Unfortunately, the Florida
Supreme Court quashed the Markham decision on the ground that
"the lawsuit was improperly commenced by one who lacked legal
standing. '46 The supreme court's refusal to accept Markham left open
the possibility that ad valorem taxes would be applied against nonresi-
dents, which is exactly what happened in Collier County.
The Collier County tax appraiser assessed an ad valorem tax
against the household property of Peter W. Herzog, a Missouri resi-
dents, even though the assets taxed were not used for commercial pur-
poses. Herzog contested the tax at trial, but the trial court approved
the tax, granting summary judgment to the appraiser. The taxpayer
appealed the trial court's decision to the Second District Court of
Appeal.
The district court determined that, even though Markham had
been quashed because of a defect in standing, the reasoning used by the
First District in its Markham decision was perfectly sound.47 In Mark-
42. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (1968) provides: "By general law regulations shall
be prescribed which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad valorem
taxation."
43. The D.O.R. cited Article VII, section 3(b) of the Florida Constitution for the
proposition that the "household goods" exclusion only applied to heads of families re-
siding in Florida." The exclusion can be limited by the state, but in no even can the
exclusion be less than one thousand dollars.
44. 467 So. 2d at 983.
45. 381 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
46. Department of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1981).
47. 437 So. 2d at 227.
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ham, the First District Court of Appeal extensively discussed the his-
tory of taxation of household goods in Florida noting that "when sec-
tion 200.01, Florida Statutes (1965), was amended by the legislature in
1967 to exclude household goods and personal effects used for the com-
fort of the owner and for non-commercial purposes from the definition
of 'tangible personal property,' such goods and effects were effectively
eliminated from the operation of the taxing statutes, regardless of resi-
dency of the owner."'48 Following the reasoning set forth in Markham,
the Second District Court of Appeal held that Herzog's personal effects
in Florida are not subject to ad valorem taxation. 9
After rendering its decision in favor of Herzog, the district court
certified the question of whether or not household goods and personal
effects are subject to ad valorem taxation in Florida.50 The supreme
court accepted jurisdiction over the matter, believing the issue to be of
great public importance.51
The supreme court's decision on the certified question was not sur-
prising. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that all
personal effect property is exempt from ad valorem taxation.5 2 The su-
preme court's willingness to adopt the rationale of the First District in
Markham,3 even though Markham was quashed, indicates that the
court was hoping that a case like Herzog, in which the taxpayer had
proper standing, would arise, and the issue of ad valorem taxes on
household goods would be resolved. Clearly, after Herzog, all non-com-
mercial household property is exempt from ad valorem taxation.
Taxpayer Standing: North Broward Hospital District v.
Fornes54
To some extent, every taxpayer has a stake in every governmental
action. After all, taxpayers ultimately pay the bills. However, the fact
that a person is a taxpayer, in and of itself, is generally not enough to
give that taxpayer standing to challenge the government's action in a
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 226.
51. 467 So. 2d at 981. The supreme court accepted jurisdiction under article V,
section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.
52. 467 So. 2d at 982.
53. Id.
54. 476 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1985).
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court of law.55 In fact, most courts have held that a taxpayer must
show some special injury, distinct from other taxpayers, in order to
have standing.56 The only exception to the special injury requirement is
where the taxpayer raises a constitutional challenge to the exercise of
governmental taxing and spending powers. 57
Therefore, when Sharon Fornes, a taxpayer, sued the North Brow-
ard Hospital District, a special taxing district, and alleged that the Dis-
trict acted illegally in awarding construction contracts not to the lowest
bidder, but instead to favored companies, the question of taxpayer
standing was raised. Ms. Fornes contended that she did not need to
show any special damages in order to bring her suit, and that the fact
that her taxes would be higher because of the district's actions should
be sufficient to give her standing."8 The trial court disagreed with
Fornes, and dismissed her suit because she lacked standing.
However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's decision, and held that Fornes did, indeed, have standing to sue
to prevent the illegal expenditure of public funds. 59 Yet, the district
court decided that the issue was of great public importance and there-
fore merited certification to the Supreme Court of Florida.60
The supreme court quashed the district court's decision, holding
that a mere increase in taxes does not confer standing upon a taxpayer
to challenge a governmental expenditure.6" The court emphasized that
"in the event an official threatens an unlawful act, the public by its
representatives must institute proceedings to prevent it, unless a private
person can show a damage peculiar to his individual interests in which
case equity will grant him succor."62 Furthermore, the court stated that
55. E.g., Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Joachim, 146 Fla. 50, 200 So. 238 (1941),
holding that a mere increase in taxes does not confer standing upon a taxpayer to
challenge a governmental expenditure.
56. E.g., Richman v. Whitehurst, 73 Fla. 152, 74 So. 205 (1916), holding that a
private person must show some special damages in order to sue a public official who
threatens an unlawful act. See also, McFarland v. Atkins, 594 P.2d 758 (Okla. 1978),
and Application of Biester, 487 Pa. 438, 409 A.2d 848 (1979).
57. Department of Admin. v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972).
58. Fornes pointed to the fact that the district was granting contracts for bids
higher than necessary. She contended that the additional cost of the contracts would
cause increased taxes to cover the costs of the contracts.
59. Fornes v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 455 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
60. Id. at 586.
61. 476 So. 2d at 154.
62. Id. at 155.
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Fornes had not raised a constitutional issue upon which to base her
claim of standing."3
While the court justified its decision by pointing to the importance
of allowing state and county governments to exercise lawfully their tax-
ing and spending authority without undue hinderance,"4 it is important
to note Justice Ehrlich's dissent in this case."' The justice discussed
several prior Florida decisions which allowed taxpayers to have stand-
ing upon a showing that a governmental agency had improvidently used
public funds.," Such allegations constitute special injury to all taxpay-
ers. 7 Otherwise, the justice argued, governmental agencies which ig-
nored or violated the law would be insulated from accountability to the
citizens whose trust they violate.6
Justice Ehrlich's argument should be noted by the court in future
questions concerning taxpayer standing, as it is, in this writer's opinion,
the better position for two basic reasons. First, the supreme court
stated that its aim was to protect the "lawful application"6' 9 of the tax-
ing and spending powers of state and county governments from being
unduly hampered. In the Fornes case, on the other hand, a taxpayer
was contesting an arguably unlawful application of the Hospital Dis-
trict's spending powers. Secondly, the supreme court majority opinion
stated that public officers should bring suit against other public officials
who act improvidently. Public servants often do not act against other
public servants, which would leave taxpayers as a whole without any
63. Id.
64. Id. at 156.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Peck v. Spencer, 26 Fla. 23, 7 So. 642 (1890); Chamberlain v. City
of Tampa, 40 Fla. 74, 23 So. 572 (1898); Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963
(1912).
67. While the cases cited by Justice Ehrlich in note 66, supra, are all of older
vintage, it should be noted that several states have allowed taxpayer standing without a
showing of damages peculiar to a particular taxpayer. For example, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has held that the right of a taxpayer to maintain an action in the
courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds cannot be denied; a taxpayer, suing
only as a taxpayer, has standing to challenge administrative action which is unlawful.
McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. 1977). The Georgia and Nebraska Supreme
Courts have also allowed taxpayers standing solely on the basis that they were taxpay-
ers. Brock v. Hall County, 239 Ga. 160, 236 S.E.2d 90 (1977); Cunningham v. Exxon,
202 Neb. 563, 276 N.W.2d 213 (1979).
68. 476 So. 2d at 156.
69. id. (citing Paul v. Blake, 376 So. 2d 256, 259-260 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979)).
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recourse. Thus, the supreme court's opinion in Fornes, in holding that a
taxpayer must show special injury other than an illegal act by a gov-
ernmental unit, in order to have standing, is much too broad. There
have to be circumstances in which a private citizen can force a public
agency into accountability, and Fornes should have been such a case. 70
Enforcement and Review: Redford v. Department of Revenue 1
Another question resolved by the Florida Supreme Court in 1985
was whether of not the Department of Revenue has the authority to
overrule or challenge decisions of a County Property Appraiser or
Property Appraisal Adjustment Board.7 2 Generally, the County Prop-
erty Appraiser (appraiser) is allowed to appeal decisions of the Prop-
erty Adjustment Board (board). 3 However, in Redford the appraiser
refused to appeal the board's decision, so the Department of Revenue
(D.O.R.) chose to bring an action itself.
Basically, the facts of Redford are quite simple. When the D.O.R.
reviewed the appraiser's assessment roles for 1979,74 it decided that
some twenty-five leaseholds in Miami International Airport should not
be exempt from real property taxes. In order for such leaseholds to be
exempt, they must be used for some governmental, municipal or public
purpose.7 5 The D.O.R. determined that the leaseholds, while on Dade
County property,7 were used for commercial, rather than governmen-
70. One of the major problems with the Fornes decision is that it is hard to
imagine a taxpayer who would be able to show the special injury required by the court.
After all, Ms. Fornes lived in the North Broward Hospital District. Clearly, her tax
burden was more specifically affected than a taxpayer living in other parts of Broward
County, or other parts of Florida. It is unfortunate that Florida views taxpayer stand-
ing on a plane equal to that of the United States federal government, which has con-
sistently dismissed taxpayer suits for lack of showing special injury. See, e.g., Public
Citizen, Inc. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Florida does not need to pro
tect itself from taxpayer suits to the same extent that the federal government does
While some protection is needed, the Court in Fornes seems to have completely ovel
looked the need to protect private citizens from the impropriety of public officials.
71. 478 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1985).
72. Id., at 810.
73. FLA. STAT. §§ 193.122(2) and 194.032(6) (1985).
74. This review was conducted in accordance with FLA. STAT. § 193.144 (198:
75. FLA. STAT. §§ 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) (1985).
76. Certain leaseholds on property owned by a county are exempt under F
STAT. §§ 125.019 and 159.15 (1985). Dade County owns the Miami Internatic
Airport.
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tal purposes. The appraiser agreed with the D.O.R.'s determination,
and forwarded assessment rolls to the board. The board, however, re-
fused to accept the D.O.R.'s position, and continued to treat the lease-
holds as tax-exempt. The D.O.R. asked the appraiser to appeal the
board's decision, but the appraiser did not make an appeal. Thus, the
D.O.R. was forced to file its own suit in the circuit court.
The circuit court granted the D.O.R.'s motion for summary judg-
ment, and held that the leaseholds were not tax-exempt. On appeal, the
District Court of Appeal for the Third District agreed that the lease-
holds should be placed on the tax rolls, but vacated the trial court's
conclusion that the leaseholds were not tax exempt, since the actual
taxpayers were not present to litigate their claims.7 The district court,
instead, granted the affected taxpayers sixty days to challenge the
D.O.R.'s assessment.
At the supreme court, the board argued that only taxpayers or the
appraiser should be allowed to challenge a decision by the board.7 8 The
court rejected this argument on three grounds. First, the appraiser had
statutory authority 9 to appeal the D.O.R.'s initial decision that the
property was taxable, but he chose, instead, to agree with the D.O.R.,
and therefore should have appealed the board's decision when the
D.O.R. requested such an appeal. Secondly, the board acted without
authority when it chose to defy both the D.O.R. and the appraiser.80
Finally, the D.O.R. has statutory authority8 to "bring actions at law or
equity to enforce any lawful order, rule, regulation or decision . ..
lawfully made under the authority of the tax laws." '82
As to the merits of the D.O.R.'s assessment, the supreme court,
like the district court, refused to make a determination about the ac-
tual status of the leaseholds until the taxpayers were actually before
the court.83 The court was mildly upset with the D.O.R. for failing to
include the appropriate taxpayers in its suit; suing the taxpayers would
have been much more efficient as all parties would have been before the
court at one time, allowing for a resolution of the merits of the case as
77. Redford v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
78. 478 So. 2d at 811.
79. FLA. STAT. § 196.098 (1983).
80. 478 So. 2d 808, 811.
81. FLA. STAT. § 195.092 (1983).
82. 478 So. 2d at 811.
83. Id.
Tax 1165
13
Gershon: Of Alligators and Hotel Beds: A Review of Florida Supreme Court D
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
well as its procedural propriety.84
All in all, the supreme court rendered the correct decision in a
case which was rather poorly handled by all parties involved. It should
be noted that, for all practical purposes, the Redford scenario can only
arise in a situation in which the appraiser changes his position mid-
stream and refuses to appeal a board decision which is pro-taxpayer.
85
Conclusion
In conclusion the Florida Supreme Court's 1985 decisions on taxa-
tion can be generally be characterized as logical and well-reasoned.
However, the court should revisit its determination in Fornes86 that no
taxpayer can ever have standing absent a showing of special injury, or
some constitutional claim. The court must adopt a policy which allows
taxpayers to have standing in situations where a denial of taxpayer
standing would totally insulate governmental units from having to ac-
count for their allegedly illegal activities.
84. The court stated "[p]arenthetically, we add that it would have been prefera-
ble from the standpoint of judicial economy for the department to have included the
affected taxpayers in its suit. This would have permitted the circuit court to reach a
judgment on the merits which would have bound all interested parties." Id.
85. After all, taxpayers themselves will appeal a decision disfavorable to them.
The Department of Revenue, on the other hand, would never appeal a decision in its
favor. The Redford case can only arise when the property appraiser refuses to appeal a
decision in favor of a taxpayer, after he has previously adopted the D.O.R.'s position.
86. The court should look to the progressive standards of taxpayer standing
which have been established by various other states. See supra note 67.
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